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Tyler Durden's picture


Back in December 2013 we pointed out something that virtually nobody had noted or discussed: when it comes to "credit" creation, China's $15 trillion in freshly-created bank loans since the financial crisis - ostensibly the global credit buffer that allowed China to not get dragged down by the western recession - dwarfed the credit contribution by DM central banks.


In order to offset the lack of loan creation by commercial banks, the "Big 4" central banks - Fed, ECB, BOJ and BOE - have had no choice but the open the liquidity spigots to the max. This has resulted in a total developed world "Big 4" central bank balance of just under $10 trillion, of which the bulk of asset additions has taken place since the Lehman collapse.
How does this compare to what China has done? As can be seen on the chart below, in just the past 5 years alone, Chinese bank assets (and by implication liabilities) have grown by an astounding $15 trillion, bringing the total to over $24 trillion, as we showed yesterday. In other words, China has expanded its financial balance sheet by 50% more than the assets of all global central banks combined!
And that is how - in a global centrally-planned regime which is where everyone now is, DM or EM - your flood your economy with liquidity. Perhaps the Fed, ECB or BOJ should hire some PBOC consultants to show them how it's really done.

This dramatic divergence in credit creation continued for about a year, then gradually Chinese new loans topped out primarily due to regulation slamming shut カスタムアイシードール☆105(確認用) and since credit accumulation resulted in parallel build up in central bank reserves, the current period of debt creation going into reverse has led to not only China's currency devaluation but what we first warned was Reverse QE, and has since picked up the more conventional moniker "Quantitative Tightening."
But while China's credit topping process was inevitable, a far more sinister development has emerged: as we 新品 グッチ〔パドロック〕GG スモール ショルダーバッグ, while DM central banks - excluding the Fed for the time being - have continued to pump liquidity at full blast into the global, fungibly-connected, financial system, there has been virtually no impact on risk assets...

... especially in the US where the S&P is now down not only relative to the end of QE3, but is down 5% Y/Y - the biggest annual drop since 2008.
This cross-flow dynamic is precisely what David Tepper was OFF-WHITE STRAW HAT NUDE 麦わら帽子when the famous hedge fund manager declared the "Tepper Top" and went quite bearish on the stock market.
This dynamic is also the topic of a must-read report by Citi's Matt King titled quite simply: "Has the world reached its credit limit?" and which seeks to answer a just as important question: "Why EM weakness is having such a large impact", a question which we hinted at 2 years ago, and which is now the dominant topic within the financial community, one which may explain why development market central bank liquidity "has suddenly stopped working."
King's explanation starts by showing, in practical terms, where the world currently stands in terms of the only two metrics that matter in a Keynesian universe: real growth, and credit creation.



His summary: there has been plenty of credit, just not much growth.
So the next logical question is where has this credit been created. Our readers will know the answer: the marginal credit creator ever since the financial crisis were not the DM central banks - they were merely trying to offset private sector deleveraging and defaults; all the credit growth came from Emerging Markets in general, and China in particular.



Alternatively, it should come as no surprise that credit creation in EMs is the opposite: here money creation took place in the conventional loan-deposit bank-intermediated pathway, with a side effect being the accumulation of foreign reserves boosting the monetary base. Most importantly, new money created in EMs, i.e., China led to new investment, even if that investment ultimately was massively mis-allocted toward ghost cities and unprecedented commodity accumulation. It also led to what many realize is the world's most dangerous credit bubble as it is held almost entirely on corporate balance sheets where non-performing loans are growing at an exponential pace.

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The above lays out the market dynamic that took place largely uninterrupted from 2008 until the end of 2014.
And then something changed dramatically.
That something is what we said started taking place last November when we pointed out the "death of the petrodollar", when as a result of the collapse in oil prices oil exporters started doing something they have never done before: they dipped into their FX reserves and started selling. This reserve liquidation first among the oil exporting emerging market, is essentially what has since morphed into a full blown capital flight from the entire EM space, and has also resulted in China's own devaluation-driven reserve (i.e., Treasury) liquidation, which this website also noted first back in May.
As King simply summarizes this most important kink in the story, after years of reserve accumulation, EMs have now shifted to reserve contraction which, in the simplest possible terms means, "money is being destroyed" which in turn is the source of the huge inflationary wave slowly but surely sweeping over the entire - both EM and DM - world.

But while one can debate what the impact on money destruction would be on equities and treasurys, a far clearer picture emerges when evaluting the impact on the underlying economy. As King, correctly, summarizes without the capex boost from energy (which won't come as long as oil continues its downward trajectory), and DM investment continues to decline, there is an unprecedented build up in inventory, which in turn is pressuring both capacity utilization, the employment rate, and soon, GDP once the inevitable inventory liquidation takes place.

The take home is highlighted in the chart above, but just in case it is missed on anyone here it is again: the "fundamentals point overwhelmingly downwards."

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Furthermore, while we have listed the numerous direct interventions by central banks over the past 7 years, the reality is that an even more powerful central bank weapon has been central bank "signalling", i.e., speaking, threatening and cajoling. As Citi summarizes "The power of CBs’ actions has stemmed more from the signalling than from the portfolio balance effect."


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